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Philosophers and psychologists have come to recognize contempt as a crucial concept for 
understanding moral and social life. Yet its conceptual history remains understudied. This 
essay argues that contempt underwent an important conceptual shift at the end of the 1640’s 
with the publication of René Descartes’ Passions de l’âme. Prior to the appearance of 
Descartes’s treatise early modern philosophers generally excluded contempt from their 
taxonomies of the passions, treating it instead as a form of indifference. To have contempt of 
something (death, illness, wealth) was to be free of passion in the face it. Following 
Descartes’s intervention, however, philosophers came increasingly to include contempt 
among the passions, those unruly perturbations of the mind that could have benign or 
dangerous effects depending on how well they were moderated. This was a change that 
harbored practical as well as philosophical implications. For what had once been an emblem 
of one’s self-mastery was now itself a passion in need of careful regulation. More 
specifically, much aristocratic contempt now signified a lack of self-control that threatened 
civil peace rather than a cool display of superiority. The article concludes by drawing out the 
affinities (and dis-affinities) between this mid-seventeenth-century reconceptualization of 
contempt as a passion and the current attempt by philosophers to redeem contempt as a 
morally justifiable attitude. 
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Contempt is both a powerful moral concept and one especially difficult to analyse. 
This difficulty is due in no small part to lack of agreement over what exactly it is. At times 
contempt can resemble an emotion like revulsion or shame, a visceral response to something 
that strikes us as vile. In other respects it more closely resembles an entirely dispassionate 
form of regard or even numbness. The Stoic who has contempt for pain or death claims to feel 
no emotion in the face of these two conventional evils, precisely because he has trained 
himself not to think of them as evils at all. Philosophers who have recently taken an interest in 
contempt have preferred to categorize it as ‘moral attitude’ rather than an emotion per se.2 
Some psychologists, taking the opposite tack, have concluded that contempt belongs on the 
list of the so-called ‘basic emotions.’ To support their case they have even tried to identify a 
facial expression for contempt that cuts across cultural differences (the most popular 
candidate so far has been the narrowing of the eyes and an upturned lip on one side of the 
face).3 For others contempt is best understood as a compound of other more primary emotions 
such as anger and disgust.4  
Lack of agreement over what contempt is has not precluded debate over its value to 
moral and political life. A recent article in the New York Times warned that the increasing 
presence of contempt in politics was a cause for worry because contempt is more toxic than 
other negative emotions such as hatred or anger.5 The latter, it was implied, at least have the 
virtue of encouraging people to engage with whoever or whatever has provoked them. The 
hate-filled and angry, after all, are rarely shy about communicating the reasons for why they 
feel the way they do and can therefore be relied upon to sustain a verbal exchange with those 
they detest. Contempt, by contrast, seems to prompt withdrawal rather than engagement.6 To 
regard someone with contempt is not to consider them the holder of mistaken views that we 
might venture to correct, but rather to see them as fundamentally worthless and so 
undeserving of even negative attention. For some, this tendency to ‘signal that the 
                                                        
1 The author would like to thank Celeste McNamara, Edward Skidelsky, Rebekah Sterling, and 
audiences at Oxford and Westminster for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. 
2 Michele Mason refers to contempt as ‘an attitude’ but concedes that one ‘might just as easily refer to 
it as an emotion or feeling.’ Michele Mason, ‘Contempt as a Moral Attitude,’ Ethics 113, no. 2 (2003), 
239. Macalester Bell notes that ‘[u]nlike some emotions (e.g. anger and disgust), contempt seems to 
lack a characteristic feeling.’ Bell continues to refer to contempt as an emotion but one that closely 
resembles a form of regard. Macalester Bell, Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 27.  
3 Paul Ekman excluded contempt from his initial catalogue of six basic emotions but later added it. See 
Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen, ‘A New Pan-Cultural Facial Expression of Emotion’ Motivation 
and Emotion 10, no. 2 (1986), 160.   
4 Jesse Pinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 67. 
5 Karen Stohr, ‘Our New Age of Contempt’ New York Times, January 23 2017.  
6 For an excellent account of this aspect of contempt see Bell, Hard Feelings, 38-40. 
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conversation is over’ makes contempt fundamentally incompatible with the basic respect 
owed to all persons.7 Contempt can seem particularly out of place in democratic cultures 
supposedly committed to the equal worth of all. As one commentator has put it, contempt in 
democracies is always likely to be ‘accompanied by a sense of its own doubtful legitimacy’ 
precisely because the members of such societies baulk at the very notion of a hierarchy of 
worth.8 Even so, contempt has had its recent defenders too, particularly among ethicists keen 
to rehabilitate it as the appropriate moral response to those who have severely compromised 
themselves by their misconduct.9  
Debate over the nature and legitimacy of contempt is hardly unique to our own time, 
however. In what follows I aim to recover a comparable early modern controversy over how 
contempt should be categorized, what its dangerous effects might be, and whether it has any 
legitimate function. Focusing on English and French philosophers of the passions, I will argue 
that contempt underwent an important conceptual shift towards the end of the 1640’s. Prior to 
that moment early modern philosophers generally excluded contempt from their taxonomies 
of the passions, treating it instead as a form of indifference. To have contempt for something 
(death, illness, sorrow, wealth) was to be free of passion in the face it. Around the middle of 
the seventeenth century, however, philosophers came increasingly to include contempt among 
the passions, those unruly perturbations of the mind that could have both benign and 
calamitous effects depending on how well they were moderated. This was a change with 
practical as well as philosophical implications. For what had once been a sign of one’s self-
mastery was now itself a passion in need of moderation. More specifically, once contempt 
was re-imagined as passionate, aristocratic displays of contempt could be readily 
characterised as exhibiting a lack of self-control rather than a cool demonstration of 
superiority. This was critically important at a moment when the ethos of an independent 
aristocracy was widely seen as an encouraging feuding and other forms of violence, a 
problem to which political absolutism was increasingly offered as a solution.  
The pivotal turning point in this reconceptualization of contempt as a passion, I 
maintain, was the publication of René Descartes’ Passions de l’âme in 1649. Original to 
Descartes’ analysis was his presentation of contempt as species of wonder (or admiration), a 
passion that occupied a central place in his schema. To experience contempt towards an 
object, for Descartes, was to experience wonder at its smallness, just as to esteem something 
was to marvel at its grandeur. The significance of Descartes’ move was twofold. By 
                                                        
7 Thomas Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 60. 
8 William I. Miller, ‘Upward Contempt’ Political Theory 23, no. 3 (1995), 479.  
9 For qualified defenses of contempt see Mason, ‘Contempt as a Moral Attitude’ and Bell, Hard 
Feelings. Even Kant has emerged recently as a defender of contempt. See Krista Thomason, ‘Shame 
and Contempt in Kant’s Moral Theory’ Kantian Review 18, no. 2 (2013), 221-240. 
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classifying contempt as a passion, Descartes was able to specify its potential utility as a 
discouragement to vice, while at the same time presenting it as just as unruly, capable of 
abuse, and in need of regulation as any other passion.  
Descartes’ preferred means of regulating contempt was through the cultivation of a 
legitimate form of self-esteem he termed générosité, borrowing the term (though not the 
sense) from the aristocratic honour codes of his day. The viability of this remedy, I next 
argue, became a principal fault-line dividing philosophers of the passions who came after 
Descartes, many of whom were similary dismayed at the unsociable effects of contempt in the 
aristocratic societies of their day. Thomas Hobbes, for one, adopted elements of Descartes’ 
analysis of contempt in the taxonomy of the passions he presented in Leviathan and even 
allowed for the possibility of legitimate self-esteem. But he ultimately rejected Descartes’ 
Stoic-inspired account of what such self-esteem might look like. It was among Descartes’ 
French Augustinian disciples such as Nicolas Malebranche, however, that the implications of 
his novel conceptualization of contempt were most fully explored but also where his ethic of 
générosité encountered the greatest skepticism. I conclude by drawing out the affinities (and 
dis-affinities) between this mid-seventeenth century reconceptualization of contempt as a 
passion and the current attempt by philosophers to redeem contempt as a morally justifiable 
attitude.  
 
2. Before Descartes: Contempt as Indifference  
 
Contempt rarely featured in taxonomies of the passions prior to the early modern 
period. It featured nowhere, for example, in the list of eleven passions found in Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologica or in the comparable list contained in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. 
Instead the Latin terms contemno, contemnere, and contemptus generally denoted an attitude 
of calm indifference rather than emotional disturbance. The first Latin translation of the 
Nichomachean Ethics used the word contemptivus to describe not a passion but rather the 
indifferent attitude of the ‘great souled man’ towards illusory goods.10  Similarly, for the 
Stoics, contempt implied that one was in command of one’s passions rather than being 
subjected to them, as when the sage shows contempt for things considered to be good or bad 
(and hence passion-inducing) by non-sages. According to Thomas Elyot’s 1542 Latin to 
English Dictionary the definition of contemptor, aris was to ‘sette lyttell by.’ 11  Thomas 
Cooper’s ‘enriched’ 1552 edition of the text made the element of indifference more emphatic 
                                                        
10 Grosseteste, cited in Tobias Hoffmann, ‘Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Magnaminity’ in 
Istvan P. Bejczy, Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 105. My thanks to Edward 
Skidelsky for alerting me to this reference.  
11 Thomas Elyot, Bibliotheca Eliotae (London: Thomae Bertheleti, 1542).  
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still. In Cooper’s version, the contemptor was now someone who ‘setteth nothyng by a thyng’ 
or ignores it entirely.12  
 The philosophical literature on the passions that blossomed in seventeenth-century 
Europe (much of it taking its starting point from Aristotle and the Stoics) was similarly 
disinclined to treat contempt as a passion. The reasons for this were at least threefold. In the 
first place, beginning in England with Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Minde (1601) 
and in France with Jean Pierre Camus’ Traité des Passions (1614), most seventeenth-century 
philosophers considered passions to be motions or disturbances of the mind that move us 
towards or away from some perceived good or bad. Jean-François Senault’s De l'usage des 
passions of 1641 was typical in defining a passion as ‘nothing else, but a motion of the 
sensitive appetite, caused by the imagination of an appearing or veritable good, or evil.’13 By 
contrast, to experience contempt towards something was generally to be unmoved by it. As 
Thomas Hobbes would later define it in Leviathan (more on which below), contempt was a 
kind of ‘immobility of the heart’ rather than an impulse towards or away from an object.14   
Secondly, seventeenth-century philosophers also generally agreed that passions had a 
corporeal dimension, which again was difficult to spot in the case of contempt. The passions, 
Thomas Wright declared, invariably caused some ‘alteration in the body’ and could be readily 
identified by some outward physical symptom. 15  A man’s passions, Senault similarly 
affirmed, were evident in the ‘colour of his face, by the flame which sparkles in his eyes’ and 
‘by the shaking of his joynts’ among other ‘signes.’16 But it was far from clear how (or even 
whether) contempt manifested itself physically in this way. The signs of contempt in a 
person’s bearing or countenance (a haughty laugh, a curled lip, a sneering squint) were not 
nearly as consistent or agreed upon as blushing was for shame or bulging veins for anger. 
Marin Cureau de La Chambre, in the first volume of his Les charactères des passions (1640), 
associated contempt (mépris) with a raised nose as if the contemnor wished to sniff out and 
‘hunt whatever they scorned [comme si elle vouloit chasser ce qu’elle dégaigne]’ but this was 
by no means universally agreed upon.17   
                                                        
12 Thomas Elyot, Bibliotheca Eliotae: Eliote’s dictionarie the second tyme enriched, and more 
perfectly corrected, by Thomas Cooper, schole maister of Maudlens in Oxforde (London: Thomae 
Bertheleti, 1552). 
13 Jean François Senault, The Use of Passions, trans. Henry Carey, Earl of Monmouth (London: J. L. & 
Humphrey Moseley, 1649), 17. Thomas Wright also argued that ‘all of our passions either tend to some 
good, or flie from some evil.’ Thomas Wright, The Passions of the Minde (London: printed by V.S, 
1601), 45. 
14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39. 
15 Senault, The Use of Passions,14. 
16 Senault, The Use of Passions, 9.   
17 Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Les charactères des passions (Paris: Jacques D’Allin, 1662): 17. Les 
charactères des passions was produced in four volumes between 1640 and 1662. Citations are to the 
1662 edition of the first (1640) volume. 
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 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, contempt had no discernible purpose in the 
way that most passions were held to. Most seventeenth-century philosophers rejected the 
Stoic view that the passions were inherently pathological and instead affirmed that each had a 
specific function (in the paradigmatic examples fear prompts us to flee danger and anger 
encourages us to avenge injustices).18 These functions, moreover, bore the stamp of a divine 
plan, the idea being that because passions were an elementary part of human mental life then 
God must have put them there deliberately for our benefit. God endowed us with passions, 
Edward Reynolds wrote in his Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man 
(1640), to encourage us to pursue things that ‘beareth a natural conveniencie’ and avoid 
things that are ‘noxious and destructive.’ 19  Although the passions, Thomas Wright 
proclaimed, have the capacity to ‘blind reason’ and ‘seduce the will’ they are nevertheless 
‘meanes to help us’ provided by God.20 But whereas passions such as hatred or fear could 
quite easily be imagined to be useful for virtue or self-preservation, this was far from the case 
with contempt.  
To the extent that contempt featured at all in this literature, it was usually not as a 
passion in its own right but rather as a derivative of hatred. This relation of dependence was 
given particularly dramatic expression in the anonymously written Pathomachia, or the Battle 
of the Affections (1630) a text that was more allegorical play than philosophical treatise. The 
Pathomachia depicts a kind of civil war of the soul in which the minor passions stage a revolt 
against the dual monarchy of Love and Hatred. Consistent with the taxonomical conventions 
of the time contempt features nowhere in the roster of fifteen ‘affections’ that (along with 
eleven virtues and twenty-five vices) make up the play’s cast of characters. Nevertheless its 
sole appearance in the play is telling. In the opening act Love convokes a Parliament of the 
Passions to hear their grievances. Hatred cannot bring herself to attend and so sends 
‘contempt’ and ‘dislike’ (her ‘minions’) to act as her representatives.21 In the rebellion of the 
passions that forms the basis of the play’s plot contempt plays no role whatsoever, having 
presumably remained a loyal subordinate of Hatred. Even ‘disdaine’ (the closest equivalent to 
contempt among the play’s main protagonists) struggles to emerge from under Hatred’s 
shadow. For although disdain ‘seemeth to contemn’ in reality it ‘hateth,’ suggesting that even 
                                                        
18 As Amy Schmitter puts it, very few seventeenth-century philosophers ‘issued blanket condemnations 
of the passions, even when seeking remedies for them.’ Amy Schmitter, ‘Passions and Affections’ in 
ed. Peter R. Anstey, The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 447.  
19 Edward Reynolds, A treatise of the passions and facvlties of the soul of man (London: Robert 
Bostock, 1640): 32. See also Senault’s ‘apologies for passions against the Stoicks.’ Senault, The Use of 
the Passions, 1.   
20 Wright, The Passions of the Minde, 3.  
21 Anon., Pathomachia or, the Battle of the Affections, Shadowed by a Faigned Siedge of the Citie 
Pathopolis (London: Thomas and Richard Coats, 1630), 6.  
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disregard usually conceals an underlying aversion.22 Disdain, in other words, is only ever a 
feigned indifference, incapable of becoming a true form of unconcern.  
In highlighting disdain’s dependence upon hatred, the anonymous author of 
Pathomachia hit upon a paradox of contempt that would recur in philosophical treatments of 
the subject: namely that those who take the trouble to display contempt for another (rather 
than simply ignoring them) have already failed to treat them with indifference. Thomas 
Hobbes was unequivocal that those who go out of their way to contemn others might be 
trying to convey indifference but more often than not reveal vainglory and cowardice 
instead.23 After all, to make known one’s contempt for another person through a laugh, a 
word, or a gesture was not to disregard them but to select them for special (albeit unwanted) 
attention. This argument would later reach its fullest expression in the philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer according to whom ‘whoever shows contempt thereby gives a sign of some 
regard in so far as he wants to let the other man know how little he esteems him.’24 In this 
way, Schopenhauer concluded, he ‘betrays hatred which excludes and only feigns 
contempt.’25 A more ‘genuine’ contempt, by contrast, is a ‘firm conviction of the other man’s 
worthlessness’ and so is ‘incompatible with consideration.’26    
If contempt did not make the standard taxonomies of the passions it was nevertheless 
essential to understanding a key passion on every philosopher’s list: anger. The reasoning 
here was that anyone who discovered that they were being regarded with indifference would 
quickly fly into a rage. Indeed, whatever else they might have disagreed upon nearly all 
theorists of the passions concurred with Aristotle’s argument in the Rhetoric that the 
suspicion that one is the object of contempt was the chief (or possibly only) cause of anger. In 
the Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man, Reynolds insisted that ‘the 
fundamental and essential cause of anger’ was ‘contempt from others meeting with the love 
of ourselves’ in that anyone who feels slighted will quickly ‘desire to make knowne unto the 
persons who thus contemne him […] that there is in him more courage, power, and worth, 
than deserves to be neglected.’27 Not everyone was prepared to accept that contempt was the 
                                                        
22 Anon., Pathomachia, 40.  
23 In Elements of Law (the manuscript of which he composed in 1640) Hobbes singled out those 
‘greedy of applause from everything they do well’ as being particularly disposed to laugh 
contemptuously at others. Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, in Human 
Nature and De Corpore Politico, J.C.A Gaskin ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 54. For 
Quentin Skinner notes that for Hobbes those who laugh at others are trying to express ‘high 
confidence’ but in fact reveal ‘cowardice’ and pusillanimity. Quentin Skinner, ‘Hobbes and the Social 
Control of Unsociability’ in Al P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra eds. The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 447.  
24 Arthur Schopenhauer, Psychological remark #324, Parerga and Paralipoema volume 2, E.F.J. Payne 
trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 591. 
25 Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipoema, 591. 
26 Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipoema, 591. 
27 Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions, 317. 
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sole cause of anger, however. In the Traité des passions of 1614, Jean-Pierre Camus placed 
contempt among the causes of anger, arguing that witnessing offences to God could also 
provoke one to rage.28 Nicholas Coëffeteau, in his Tableau des passions humaines (1620), 
stuck more closely to the Aristotelian line, stating that all men will be moved to ‘choler’ if 
they consider themselves ‘contemned’ by others.29 Writing in the same year as Reynolds, 
Hobbes half-heartedly challenged the view that anger was a kind of ‘grief proceeding from an 
opinion of contempt,’ retorting that such a definition failed to account for the anger we feel at 
inanimate objects that are ‘incapable of contemning us.’30 However, Hobbes later dropped 
this dissent and returned to something like the consensus view in his De Homine, confirming 
there that anger ‘ariseth most often from the belief that one is contemned’ [passio quae 
appelatur ira… oritur quidem saepissime ab opionione contemptus].31  
Because contempt was such a potent prompt to anger it was imperative for early 
modern philosophers to understand how it might be communicated, particularly in an 
aristocratic culture plagued by fractious arguments, duels, and honour feuds.  Here too 
Aristotle served as the crucial source of insight. Aristotle’s suggestion in the Rhetoric was 
that contempt could be expressed in three different forms, each more provocative than the 
last.32  The first, disdain (καταφρόνησις), is mainly passive and manifests itself through 
neglect or withdrawal of attention from its object rather than through any active attempt to 
provoke. Aristotle’s remaining forms of contempt, by contrast, are both more active and more 
acrimonious. In the case of the second form, there is a deliberate attempt to make its object 
aware of just how indifferently they are regarded through acts of gratuitous harm inflicted 
solely out of spite (ἐπηρεασμός). Worst of all, however, was to use insults (ὕβρις) to 
communicate contempt, an offense that in the Athens of Aristotle’s day was a greater criminal 
offense than physical assault.    
Several early modern authors seized on this typology when seeking to understand the 
various ways contempt could cause anger and, by extension, interpersonal violence. Writing 
before the first English translation of the Rhetoric, John Marbeke included an analysis of 
contempt in his Booke of Notes and Commonplaces (1581) that hewed closely to Aristotle’s. 
Contempt, Marbeke wrote, ‘constiteth chieflie in three things.’ The first was a mere opinion 
that something was lowly and so remained ‘onlie in the minde.’ Marbeke did not associate 
any actions with this form of contempt, suggesting that it may even be concealed from its 
                                                        
28 Pierre Camus, Traitté des passions de l'âme (Paris, Garnier, 2014/1614), 443; Nicholas Coëffeteau A 
table of humane passions. With their causes and effects, trans. E. Grimeston (London: Nicholas Okes, 
1621), 443. 
29 Coëffeteau, A table of humane passions, 571. 
30 Hobbes, Elements, 52.  
31 Hobbes, De Homine, in Man and Citizen, Bernard Gert ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 56.  
32 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. J.H. Freese (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1926), 
175.  
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object entirely. As with Aristotle, however, Marbeke’s other forms of contempt were more 
overt. The second comprised those actions committed to frustrate another for no other 
purpose than to ‘rejoice’ at their ‘discommoditie.’ In Marbeke’s last category the contemnor 
‘adde[s] words,’ especially those ‘which have ignomie or contumlie joined with them,’ 
aggravating the offense and increasing the likihood of a feud.33 Reynolds too identified three 
forms of contempt that mapped directly onto Aristotle’s, labeling them ‘contempt,’ 
‘spitefulness,’ and ‘calumny’ (the last of these was most damaging because the effects of 
insults could ripple outwards, ruining our reputation ‘in the Eyes and Ears of the World’).34 
Finally, Pierre Charron in his De la Sagesse, similarly concluded that the ‘opinion of 
contempt’ that served as ‘the Principal … Cause of anger’ (and thus of conflict) could be 
communicated either ‘by word, deed or countenance,’ this time reversing the order of 
Aristotle’s list.35 
If one powerful effect of contempt was to inflame anger in its object and so ignite 
conflict, another was to diminish a very different passion in its subject: fear. Several students 
of the passions agreed that to have contempt for something was to be utterly unafraid of it. 
Indeed, it was the confidence associated with contempt that made people so recklessly willing 
to provoke those they despise through spiteful actions or insults. In the battle between 
passions portrayed in Pathomachia ‘Disdaine’ fights alongside ‘Hope’ on account of his bond 
to ‘Lieutenant Bouldness, or Confidence.’36 The implication was that those experiencing 
contempt for another would be so confident of victory in any quarrel that they would see little 
reason to exercise restraint. Hobbes in particular recognized that the confidence of the 
contemnor, when combined with the fact that those who feel contemned will react with 
violent fury, could have dire consequences for social peace. It was for this reason that he saw 
fit to include expressions of contempt among the behaviours prohibited by the laws of 
nature.37  
The fearlessness associated with contempt had implications not only for social 
relations but also for political authority, a potent concern at a moment when monarchs were 
eager to consolidate their rule at the expense of an independent aristocracy. In France several 
theorists of the passions worried that subjects or vassals who grew contemptuous of their 
rulers would quickly shed the salutary fear necessary for obedience. Rulers, they thus 
                                                        
33 John Marbeke, A Booke of Notes and Commonplaces (London: Thomas East, 1581), 249. 
34 Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions, 322. 
35 Pierre Charron, Of Wisdome: Three Bookes, trans. Samson Lennard (London: Edward Blount & Witt 
Aspey, 1608), 88. 
36 Anon., Pathomachia, 2. 
37 For Hobbes’ apprehensions regarding the threat that signs of contempt could pose to civil peace see 
Skinner, ‘Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability’; Theresa Bejan, Mere Civility: 
Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2017), ch. 3; 
and Kinch Hoekstra, ‘Hobbesian Equality,’ Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century, ed. S. A. 
Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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concluded, needed to avoid contempt even more assiduously than hatred (in this line of 
argument the distinction between contempt and hatred was firmer). Pierre Charron in his De 
la Sagesse of 1601 went to great lengths to show that of hatred and contempt (the two 
‘murtherers of a prince and state’) the latter posed by far the greater threat.38 Defining 
contempt as a ‘sinister, base, and abject opinion’ of a ruler, he insisted that it was ‘more 
contrarie and dangerous [to a government] than hatred.’39 Hatred, Charron explained, was 
‘modest and timorous’ because ‘helde back by fear.’40 Contempt, by contrast, had an enabling 
effect, releasing subjects from fear, arming their hatred, and giving them ‘courage to execute’ 
whatever seditious notions they might be entertaining.41  
The argument that contempt could slacken fear received a more equivocal 
endorsement in Senault’s De l’usage des passions. Wading into the controversy over whether 
it is better for rulers to be feared or loved, Senault considered the claim that contempt (the 
‘capital enemie to monarchy’) was so dangerous precisely because it was incompatible with 
fear. By contrast, contempt was perfectly compatible with love, in that we might look down 
upon weak things we adore.42 In response Senault considered the opposing view that because 
love ‘arises from valuation’ it must always be ‘accompanied by respect.’43 Senault refused to 
approve either argument unambiguously, maintaining instead that rulers must generally win 
the affection of their subjects while making exceptional uses of severity when necessary, lest 
contempt creep up on them.  
Unsurprisingly, the provenance of the argument that contempt was a solvent of fear 
(and hence of authority) lay with early modern writers on statecraft. Machiavelli in The 
Prince cautioned rulers to avoid both contempt (contemptus) and hatred (odium) if they 
wished their rule to last.44 Justus Lipsius devoted a whole chapter of his Politica (1589) to 
advancing a similar argument. Lipsius defined contempt as the ‘vile and abject opinion of the 
king and his estate’ that subjects and foreigners alike will develop towards weak rulers. This 
opinion, he stated bluntly, is the ‘death and destruction of kingdoms: yea in some respects 
more than hate.’45 A few lines down he made the contrast with hatred clearer still: ‘The first 
cause and motion of the destruction of kingdoms most commonly hath proceedeth from 
                                                        
38 Charron, Of Wisdome, 383. 
39 Charron, Of Wisdome, 385.  
40 Charron, Of Wisdome, 385. 
41 Charron, Of Wisdome, 385. 
42 Senault, The Use of Passions, 178.  
43 Senault, The Use of Passions, 180.  
44 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, eds. Quentin Skinner and Richard Price (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 63.  
45 Justus Lipsius, Six Bookes of Politics or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London: Richard 
Field, 1594), 109. Lipsius concedes, however, that contempt on its own is an insufficient impulse to 
revolt and that some admixture of hatred is usually necessary to stir rebels to action.    
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hatred; but the last, and that which hath most force, is contempt.’46 Once again the power of 
contempt was not that it drove the subject to conspire against their ruler but that it dampened 
fear, the passion most likely to inhibit those considering such a course of action. Whereas a 
subject filled with hatred but also afraid was unlikely to trouble a ruler, contempt, for Lipsius, 
‘doth let loose the bridle of fear,’ encouraging the discontented to hazard a revolt they would 
otherwise be wary of undertaking.47  
The image of contempt that emerges from this literature is of an attitude that was 
calm and destructive all at once. As a form of indifference, contempt was suggestive of inner 
calm or at the very least a lack of real disturbance. On the other hand, it could inflame angry 
conflict if communicated to others and also diminish the fearful respect required for political 
order. Yet because these thinkers refrained from including contempt in their taxonomies of 
the passions, they rarely offered the kind of detailed instructions of how it could be directed, 
regulated, or controlled that they provided for similarly disruptive affects such as hatred, 
despair, or desire. This would all change with the publication, in 1649, of René Descartes’ 
Passions de l’âme, a treatise that revealed its author to be a ‘taxonomical rebel’ prepared to 
analyse contempt as a passion in its own right and specify both its potential uses and the 
means by which it might be brought to heel.48   
 
3. Contempt Becomes a Passion: Descartes’ Passions de l’Âme 
 
From Montaigne onwards, French writing on the passions was, as Stuart Carroll 
notes, a ‘response to the violence of elite society’ and in particular to the ‘preponderant role 
played by violence in the aristocratic honour code.’49 It was a response that called not so 
much for an end to honour culture as a shift in emphasis from external manners to inner 
control. Descartes’s Passions de l’âme was part of this tradition, anatomising the human mind 
                                                        
46 Lipsius, Six Bookes of Politics or Civil Doctrine, 109. 
47 Lipsius, Six Bookes of Politics or Civil Doctrine, 109. As with the analysis of the relationship 
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The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 144. 1312b and 
145. 1313a 
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while at the same time trying to convince his readers that the surer path to honour laid in 
containing their passions rather than indulging them.   
Quite what these passions were was still a manner of some dispute, however, and it 
was here that Descartes offered himself as an innovator. One indication of his willingness to 
depart from his predecessors lay in his inclusion of contempt (along with esteem) among the 
passions operative in the mind. Contempt (mépris) makes an early appearance in Descartes’ 
taxonomy as a derivative of admiration, the feeling of wonder we experience when 
confronted with something new or extraordinary. Wonder is the first of Descartes’ six 
fundamental passions (the others being love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness) but stands more 
or less alone in this series in that it barely registers any physical effect on us at all. It prompts 
no change in the flow of our blood or animal spirits and so leaves us, physiologically 
speaking, much as we were before.50 The objects that excite our wonder neither threaten us 
with harm, nor advertise their usefulness to us, but only surprise us with their strangeness. 
Wonder, for Descartes, is thus first among the passions, not because it enjoys primacy, but 
because we experience it prior to evaluating the thing or person that astonishes us. We 
wonder, as Descartes puts it, ‘before we have any knowledge of whether the thing is 
beneficial to us or not.’ 51 If we examine the object of wonder, it is not because we hope to 
gain something from it, but simply because we wish to know more. The focus of wonder is 
never ‘on good or bad but only on the knowledge of the thing that has given rise to it.’52  
How might wonder morph into contempt? Descartes’ initial explanation for this is 
rather terse. Because we are comparative creatures sensitive to differences of scale we are 
predisposed, Descartes assumes, to wonder at objects that either loom large before us or strike 
us as miniscule. Wonder, he thus suggests, will take the form of either esteem or contempt 
‘depending on whether it is the greatness or the littleness of the object that we marvel at.’53 
Descartes acknowledges that this definition still left open to doubt whether contempt and 
esteem truly qualified as passions. It is possible, he concedes, to experience an entirely 
dispassionate opinion of esteem or contempt towards an object whose worth we have 
accurately assessed with our reason.54 Here we see traces of the Stoic claim that if the mind 
can correctly identify the nature and worth of objects that pass before it then it will never 
                                                        
50 René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul and other Late Philosophical Writings, trans. Michael 
Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 224 (art. 71). According to Thomas Carr, 
Descartes’ contempt is a ‘chiefly intellectual’ passion as the spread of the animal spirits remains 
‘localized in the brain.’ Thomas Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 53. 
51Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 220 (art. 53). 
52 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 224 (art. 71). 
53 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 220 (art. 54). As Susan James has argued, Descartes’ argument here 
carries the curious connotation that we could esteem something we do not yet evaluate as good or 
contemn something we do not yet view as bad. Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 170. 
54 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 257 (art. 149). 
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lapse into passion. But such instances, Descartes notes, are rare. Esteem and contempt might 
begin as mere opinions but they were usually followed up by a passion that reinforces that 
initial opinion. His more comprehensive definition, then, is as follows: ‘the passion of 
contempt is an inclination on the part of the soul to consider the baseness of what it despises, 
caused by the movement of the spirits that reinforces the idea of this littleness.’55  
Descartes is clear in Passions de l’âme that contempt rarely acts on us alone but 
rather combines with other passions. Much of the time, he insists, our esteem or contempt 
arrive tinged with passions of a more appetitive or aversive sort, particularly love and hatred, 
creating new alloy passions. Hence, if we come to judge that a person whose grandeur we 
wonder at (a rich person or a ruler perhaps) may advance our interest then our esteem will 
slide easily into veneration and we will anxiously seek out his or her favor. Conversely, if we 
ascertain that the object of our wonder is theoretically capable of affecting our interest but is 
too weak to do so then our contempt will shift into what Descartes calls disdain (dédain).56  
On the face of it, Descartes’ inclusion of contempt among the passions may appear 
more like a minor classificatory deviation than the beginning of an important conceptual shift. 
By classifying contempt as a passion, however, Descartes raised for the first time the 
possibility that contempt might have a distinct purpose all of its own. Descartes, in explicit 
rejection of the Stoic thesis that the passions are pathological, consistently emphasizes their 
usefulness, and contempt is no exception. Just as veneration can incline us to submit to God 
and humble ourselves before temporal authority, contempt, in the form of disdain, is useful 
for spurring us to look down upon certain vices or dishonourable habits.57 Miserliness, for 
instance, is despicable because it reveals an excessive attachment to money. The man who is 
jealous of his wife is to be disdained because if he truly loved her he would also trust her.58 
Thus although how we direct our disdain will in practice vary from person to person (such 
that what is an object of disdain to one may be an object of veneration to another), Descartes 
is clear that are some intrinsically despicable behaviours and that our disdain needs to be 
trained towards those.   
The problem for Descartes is that contempt is unruly, and frequently directed at the 
wrong targets. In a rank obsessed aristocratic society such as seventeenth-century France, 
people often venerated the unworthy and disdained those who should be respected. Such 
distortions began, Descartes argues, when we experience wonder at something grand or 
despicable in ourselves. Those who ‘know themselves least well,’ he affirms,  
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57 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 263 (art. 164).  
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are those most prone to exalt and to abase themselves more 
than they should, because any unfamiliar occurrence takes 
them by surprise; assimilating it to themselves, they become 
to themselves a source of wonderment, and feel self-esteem or 
self-contempt according as they judge that what is happening 
to them is to their advantage or not.59 
Because ‘what is happening to them’ changes constantly, the self-ignorant will vacillate 
between pride and dejection. A stroke of good fortune will prompt them to mistakenly marvel 
at themselves and degrade those around them, while an unexpected calamity will cause them 
(again mistakenly) to look with wonder at their own wretchedness and then grovel before 
those they believe to be their superiors.  
If self-wonder is the cause of these abuses then the path to mastery over them must be 
some sort of self-knowledge. Put otherwise, to avoid becoming a ‘source of wonderment’ to 
ourselves we must learn to weigh our own self-worth steadily and accurately. But on what 
basis is such an exercise in self-estimation to be conducted? In addressing this problem 
Descartes, having earlier rejected the Stoic argument that the passions must be purged from 
the soul, borrows heavily from the Roman Stoic Epictetus.60 According to Epictetus the wise 
are immune from sudden gusts of pride or dejection because they know that the only ground 
of legitimate self-esteem is the use we make of our free choice. It is senseless, Epictetus 
argued, for us to rate ourselves according to externals such as wealth, reputation, or anything 
else that lies outside of our sphere of control. Descartes, assimilating Epictetus’ concept of 
choice to his own understanding of free will, concurs entirely. The sole basis for self-esteem, 
he confirms, lies in knowing that only freely willed acts are praise or blame worthy, and 
resolving to exercise good judgment. 
Departing from his scholastic predecessors, Descartes described this feeling of 
legitimate self-esteem as générosité rather than magnanimity, its closest equivalent.61 Unlike 
the Stoic sage, those with générosité will experience passions much like anyone else, 
including humility and the self-satisfaction that comes from knowing that one has behaved 
virtuously. What is distinctive about their passions, however, is that ‘surprise is not a major 
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philosopher Epictetus.’ Victoria Kahn, ‘Happy Tears: Baroque Politics in Descartes’ Passions de 
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factor in producing them.’62 Because the generous are ‘sufficiently aware of the causes of 
their own self-esteem’ they will never lapse into the exaggerated self-wonder that lies at the 
root of both pride and abjectness.63 Descartes noted (in an argument similar to one later made 
famous by Immanuel Kant) that if the generous did not escape self-wonder entirely, it was 
only because the rational use of free will was itself so fascinating that it too could give rise to 
wonder.  
Descartes’ generous individual not only feels deserved self-satisfaction, however, he 
or she will also be more tolerant of the failings or vices that she or he perceives in others. This 
is what makes générosité so crucial to Cartesian ethics. Because the generous appreciate that 
the vices of those around them are the product of ignorance, they will not ‘think themselves 
much superior to those they themselves surpass’ and so will refrain from disdaining them.64 
Although they may use raillery to gently correct faults, they will never indulge in abusive 
ridicule or scornful speech. Not only that, but they will be immune to such provocations from 
others. Having obtained ‘absolute self-mastery’ the generous will disregard the kind of 
‘insults at which other people would normally take offense.’65 They will rebuff the spiteful 
actions of others but keep their own contempt (along with the rest of their passions) firmly 
under control. 
Descartes’ générosité has sometimes been translated, with heavy aristocratic 
overtones, as ‘nobility of soul’ and the term featured prominently in seventeenth century 
moral codes of the nobility.66 And while Descartes acknowledged that some might consider 
générosité an accident of noble birth, he assured his readers that all who can learn to wonder 
at their own rational agency could nurture it in themselves.67 The egalitarian implications of 
this move should not be lost sight of. Descartes’ experience as a volunteer soldier in the early 
stages of the Thirty Years War left him with a distaste for the martial values that drove the 
nobility to lord it over their supposed inferiors and commit acts of violence in pursuit of 
glory.68 By holding out legitimate self-esteem as a reasonable goal attainable by all, Descartes 
severed any connection between nobility of soul and family name or social rank. At the same 
time, he invited the attentive among his readers to view with suspicion any path to esteem that 
required investing in hierarchies premised on anything other than virtue and self-command.     
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4. After Descartes: Contempt, Wonder, and the Limits of Générosité 
 
Descartes’ analysis of contempt and his rehabilitation of générosité both met with 
wide approval (and some criticism) among his early readers, particularly in England. Having 
endured nearly a decade of civil war, several English thinkers welcomed an analysis of 
contempt that seemed to delegitimate an aristocratic ethos that fanned interpersonal violence 
and stood in the way of the creation of a centralized state capable of guaranteeing civil peace. 
What follows in this section is only a sampling of that reception. It should, nevertheless, be 
enough to establish that after Descartes philosophers who took an interest in the passions 
were more confident in declaring contempt among them and were open to considering 
Descartes’s recommendations for how that passion might be controlled.  
To begin with an English philosopher writing in France, there is considerable 
evidence that Hobbes, when composing Leviathan, revised his understanding of contempt 
upon encountering Descartes’ Passions de l’âme. In Elements of Law Hobbes had included no 
separate discussion of contempt and seemed to concur with the pre-Cartesian view that it was 
no passion at all. When he revised and expanded his taxonomy in Leviathan, however, 
Hobbes included contempt among the thirty or so passions that merited separate definitions. 
That he did so owed something, I suspect, to Descartes’ influence. Hobbes composed 
Leviathan while moving in Cartesian circles in Paris and by the late 1640’s he was on better 
personal terms with Descartes himself, having finally met him in 1648.69 And while the two 
had major differences on matters of epistemology, physics, and optics, they found some 
agreement on the nature and function of the passions.70 Both held, for instance, that the 
passions were perturbations of the soul that usually gave rise to some alteration of the blood 
or vital spirits. Both, moreover, argued that the passions, when functioning as they ought, 
were basically benign in that they prompted actions beneficial to our self-preservation. 
Moreover, whereas in Elements Hobbes presented all passions as more or less on the same 
footing, in Leviathan he identified seven ‘simple’ passions that aligned closely (though not 
exactly) with the six basic passions of Descartes’ Passions de l’âme.71   
When it came to defining contempt, moreover, Hobbes repeated several of Descartes’ 
moves. Most significantly, he distinguished contempt from more appetitive or aversive 
passions such as hatred or anger and concurred with Descartes that its physical effects were 
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minimal. We experience contempt, Hobbes contended, towards ‘things we neither Desire, nor 
Hate’ – a conception closer to the pre-Cartesian understanding of contempt as indifference 
rather than a movement or disturbance.72 While ‘potent objects’ that promise reward or pose a 
threat will move us to love or fear them, objects that arouse our contempt, on Hobbes’ 
definition, will leave us still.73 This definition fit well with Descartes’ claim that contempt 
and esteem are detached from the heart, blood, or other organs concerned with conveying 
information essential to our self-preservation. Indeed, it is harder to reconcile with Hobbes’ 
own framing of the passions as desires and aversions that spur movement.74    
Hobbes’ definition of contempt differed from Descartes’ in two important respects, 
however. First, whereas Descartes was comfortable listing behaviours that should be 
universally considered contemptible (even if they were not always so considered in fact), 
Hobbes saw contempt as thoroughly relative and called into doubt whether the term 
‘contemptible’ could have any stable referent at all. In his list of moral terms that lack a 
constant signification Hobbes included contempt alongside good and evil, suggesting that just 
as nothing was absolutely good or evil, nothing was absolutely contemptible either. Secondly, 
far from reducing contempt to a species of wonder, Hobbes separated the two passions. In 
Elements he had already defined wonder (or admiration) as a kind of spur to the acquisition of 
knowledge we feel when confronted with something ‘new and strange,’ and he retained the 
substance, if not the precise wording, of this definition in Leviathan.75 But admiration, in 
Leviathan, forms no part of contempt. For while it is true that, for Hobbes, things we find 
contemptible may be new to our experience, they are also things that we have little curiosity 
about. Because such objects are ‘vile and inconsiderable’ the mind passes over them rather 
than hunting for more information about them.76 Hobbes thus rejected Descartes’ claim that 
whatever we find contemptible will have some hold on our attention.  
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On the question of whether contempt could be regulated through the cultivation of 
legitimate self-esteem, thereby curbing the destructive behaviors associated with it, Hobbes 
was ambivalent. On the one hand he seemed to acknowledge that arriving (at least 
provisionally) at a more accurate reckoning of one’s own self-worth was a viable goal. In 
each of the taxonomies of the passions Hobbes published after Descartes’ Passions de l’âme 
he not only criticized excessive self-esteem (vainglory) but also offered a vision of legitimate 
self-esteem. In Leviathan the vainglorious man who mocks others is set against the ‘great 
minds’ (a phrase that recalls contemporary translations of Descartes’ générosité as ‘greatness 
of soul’) who prove themselves by freeing others from contempt and by only judging 
themselves against the most able.77 Similarly, in De Homine, Hobbes followed up a very 
Cartesian diagnosis of pride and abjectness with an encomium to legitimate self-esteem. Such 
self-esteem is not, he insists, a ‘perturbation’ at all but rather ‘a state of mind that ought to 
be.’78  
Hobbes’ legitimate self-esteem, however, was very far from being an exact 
counterpart to Cartesian générosité. For although Hobbes and Descartes agreed that legitimate 
self-esteem was both possible and desirable they differed fundamentally on its underlying 
basis. Hobbes was too much of a materialist, and too doubtful that what Descartes called free 
will could be anything other than appetite, to grant that wonder at the use of our free agency 
could constitute grounds for self-esteem. Instead, he selected a far more mundane basis for 
self-assessment. Those who estimate their worth accurately, he makes clear in De Homine, 
‘do so on the basis of their own past deeds.’79 Legitimate self-esteem, in Hobbes’ view, is 
closer to accurate self-estimation. It is not wonder at our rational agency so much as a solid 
reckoning of what we are and are not capable of based on experience gained from previous 
successes and failures.  
 Descartes’ analysis of contempt proved especially popular among moralists in 
Restoration England, many of whom were keen for alternatives to Hobbes’ psychology. The 
theologian and philosopher Henry More, an avid reader of Descartes at least since the 1640s, 
agreed both on the centrality of wonder to contempt and on the role contempt might serve as a 
corrective to vice. ‘This passion’ he wrote, ‘is not altogether unprofitable’ as ‘it suffers not 
Virtue or Truth to be abandoned, either on the threats or on the temptations of impotent men.’ 
‘Such,’ More continued, ‘was the contempt of Socrates for Anytus and Melitus, when he let 
them know, that although they had power to kill, they had not power to hurt him.’80 In 
addition, More had little hesitation in endorsing generosity as key to both inner tranquility 
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and good social behaviour. The ‘valuing a Man’s self which Descartes calls generosity,’ More 
confirmed, can be a ‘spur to the procurement of the highest felicity’81 
William Ramesey in his Gentleman’s Companion or, A Character of True Nobility, 
and Gentility (1672) was still more ardent. As his titled suggested, Ramesey was determined 
to differentiate authentic nobility from the empty courtesies and formalities of aristocratic 
life. Again Descartes’ Passions de l’âme proved of considerable use. Ramesey reproduced 
Descartes’ list of the six primary passions exactly, beginning, as Descartes did, with 
admiration, this ‘sudden surprise’ of a soul that encounters something ‘rare or different.’82 
Having categorized contempt and esteem as varieties of this passion, Ramesey moved swiftly 
to endorse Descartes’ remedy for keeping them under control. It is ‘no absurdity,’ he argued, 
for a man to ‘esteem himself’ provided that such esteem derives from the knowledge that he 
has an ‘absolute command over his will.’83 This ‘truly generous person,’ Ramesey declared, 
will have sufficient knowledge of his or her own worth that he or she will ‘never contemn, 
nor blame another’ and so prove a model of sociability.84  
 The physician and scientist Walter Charleton was also forthcoming about his debt to 
Passions de l’âme even as he gave Descartes’ Stoic argument a distinctly Epicurean twist.85  
Charleton had been an early critic of Descartes’ epistemology, but in his 1674 Natural 
History of the Passions he agreed substantively with Descartes that esteem and contempt 
were ‘consequences’ of admiration, the ‘first of all passions.’86 True to his ‘oracle’ Epicurus, 
however, Charleton immediately qualified the Cartesian position by stressing that admiration 
was only the first passion after ‘pleasure and pain.’87 That these twin drives remained primary 
in Charleton’s account reflects the fact that he drew as much from Hobbes as from 
Descartes.88 Charleton’s proposal for how the vices associated with contempt may be tackled, 
however, was unequivocally Cartesian.89 When listing the principal remedies to the 
disturbances caused by the passions, he first mentions ‘generosity,’ which he had earlier 
defined, translating Descartes’ words directly, as a man’s ‘knowing he has nothing of his own 
except his free will.’90 
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Descartes’ analysis found its greatest champion, however, in Antoine Le Grand 
whose Entire Body of Philosophy (1694) offered a comprehensive defence of the entire 
Cartesian system. Le Grand followed Descartes’s reasoning more or less to the letter, 
insisting that esteem and contempt must ‘not be taken for simple opinions’ but should be 
treated as species of admiration instead.91 As Christopher Brooke has noted, Le Grand was an 
early advocate of Stoicism who made a conversion to Cartesianism late in life.92 But the 
eagerness with which he seizes on Descartes’ Epictetean argument (the ‘right use of our free 
will is the only ground for self-esteem’) would suggest that his renouncement of Stoicism was 
never total.93  
It was among his compatriots, however, that Descartes’ analysis of contempt was 
most keenly studied, taken up, and criticized. The zealous Cartesian and mathematician 
Bernard Lamy found room for an analysis of contempt in his 1675 La Rhétorique ou l’Art de 
Parler, one of the first French rhetorical treatises written in the vernacular. Lamy followed 
the by now familiar Cartesian understanding of contempt as a form of wonder but sought to 
break new ground by drawing out the implications of his thesis for rhetoric. In doing so, 
however, he subtly revised Descartes’ argument. Whereas Descartes had treated contempt and 
esteem as simple opposites, Lamy pointed to the peculiar attraction that contempt had for the 
mind. ‘To this passion,’ he wrote, ‘we willingly incline.’ For 
it is pleasing, and flatters the ambition that men have naturally 
for superiority and grandeur. We do not properly contemn any 
but those we look upon as inferiors.  We look down upon 
them with divertissement, whereas it is troublesome to lift our 
eyes in contemplation of what is above us.94   
More violent passions, Lamy continued, ‘spend and disturb us.’ Contempt, by contrast, is so 
easy and satisfying to the mind that it is positively refreshing.  It is not a ‘commotion’ of the 
soul as other passions are but rather a welcome ‘repose.’95 Indeed, so enjoyable is contempt 
that if orators can render an argument contemptible then they soon convince their audience to 
disregard it as false.   
Other French disciples of Descartes preserved some details of his argument while 
questioning the viability of générosité as an ethical goal. In his Recherche sur la verité of 
1675, Nicolas Malebranche followed Descartes in presenting esteem and contempt as species 
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of admiration, that ‘imperfect passion’ that scarcely affects us physically.96 But if 
Malebranche shared Descartes’ basic psychological categories, he was too much of an 
Augustinian believer in human pride and sinfulness to share Descartes’ confidence that we 
can ever correct the misuse of these passions through justified self-esteem.97 Malebranche 
even launched a direct attack on the Epictetean distinction between what is and is not ‘up to 
us’ that had been so foundational to Descartes’ générosité. This ‘magnificent division’ he 
wryly conceded, ‘seems consistent with reason’ but was also ‘inconsistent with the disordered 
state to which sin has reduced us.’98  
Nor, for Malebranche, was it necessarily desirable to quell the drive for superiority 
over others that Descartes had found such an objectionable trait among social elites. 
Malebranche reckoned that what he called our ‘secret desire for greatness’ could be a useful 
spur to courage provided it remained carefully hidden from public view.99 A strenuous effort 
must be made to conceal one’s contempt for others to avoid offending other aspirants to 
superiority. ‘For in the end,’ he continued 
contempt is the ultimate insult; it is the one most capable of 
rupturing society; and naturally we should not hope that a man 
whom we have made aware that we consider him beneath us can 
ever be joined to us, because men can never stand being the 
meanest part of the body they compose.100 
Note that Malebranche seems to have accepted that contempt itself is ineradicable. His 
concern, rather, was with the disastrous effects that would follow if that contempt were made 
known to its object. Gone was the Stoic-inflected emphasis on inner command; the onus 
instead was now firmly back on avoiding needless provocation through insult. 
 Malebranche offered a more developed series of recommendations on this topic in his 
1684 Traité de morale. In Part II of that work, he repeated his earlier claim that expressed 
contempt is ‘the greatest of injuries,’ describing it now as a cruel denial of the basic dignity 
due to all humans as members of the highest species in creation.101 Even sinners, Malebranche 
declared, never forfeit this basic entitlement to dignity. For while sin itself might be 
contemptible, the sinners are not and must be afforded basic respect. If readers were not yet 
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convinced, Malebranche presented them with more prudential grounds for biting their tongues 
when the occasion to demean others presented itself. Essential to this argument was 
Malebranche’s commitment to viewing social life as an artificial (and fragile) construction.  
Because humans do not naturally seek society, and only enter into it with an eye to personal 
advantage, they need to foster the conditions under which mutually advantageous 
relationships can thrive. Expressing contempt for others is a sure way of undermining those 
conditions, making us appear obnoxious and our friendship unprofitable. For no one can ever 
‘expect any good’ from ‘those who are so unjust as to despise them.’102 Even our enemies, 
whom we may hate, must be spared our scorn, Malebranche argued, for when ‘contempt is 
open and visible’ the chance of achieving reconciliation between foes becomes remote.103    
 Malebranche’s skepticism towards Descartes’ remedies for contempt was eventually 
followed by a challenge to his definition of contempt as derivative of wonder. Isaac Watts, in 
his 1729 Plain and Particular Account of the Natural Passions, adopted Descartes’ general 
schema but signalled disagreement with the Frenchman (without naming him) on how to 
categorise contempt. Watts conceded that admiration was a ‘primitive’ passion but 
categorically denied that esteem and contempt had anything to do with it.104 While ‘some 
writers,’ Watts noted, had claimed these to be ‘species of admiration,’ it would be more 
appropriate to describe them as species of love and hatred respectively.105 His argument here 
rested on the idea that esteem and contempt were actually more turbulent than Descartes had 
made out. While ‘neglect’ (the ignoring of common things not worthy of hatred or love) was 
‘no passion,’ esteem and contempt did qualify as such because they were accompanied by at 
least some ‘ferment of the blood’ or movement of the animal spirits.106 Having made of 
contempt a bodily passion, Watts could discuss its physical traits and external characteristics 
in a way that Descartes had not. This passion ‘discovers itself by turning the Back, shrinking 
up the Nose, thrusting out the lip, by derision and laughter, and terms of ridicule and 
jeering.’107  
 By the 1730s even philosophers appreciative of Descartes were beginning to part 
ways with his analysis of the passions in general, and of contempt in particular. In volume II 
of his Treatise of Human Nature (1740) David Hume was content to follow Descartes in 
characterizing contempt as a passion. However, unlike Descartes, he refrained from 
connecting it to wonder or surprise. Instead, in a section entitled ‘Of respect and contempt,’ 
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Hume chose as his starting point our more habitual inclination to make comparisons between 
others and ourselves. He notes that people evaluate each other by one of three methods: by 
assessing the intrinsic worth of the other’s qualities, by comparing those qualities with their 
own, or by a combination of the two. It is this third mode of evaluation, Hume argues, that 
gives rise to both respect (in the case of good qualities) and contempt (in respect of bad ones). 
To regard the negative traits of another as simply odious will result, Hume maintains, in our 
feeling hatred for that person. With the addition of a reflexive element, however, what would 
be simple hatred starts to mingle with pride, forming the compound passion of contempt. 
Notably, this mixture of pride and hatred that constitutes contempt is far from evenly 
balanced in Hume’s account. For contempt has ‘so strong a tincture of pride,’ he insists, that 
there is ‘scarce any other passion discernible’ in it.108  
Hume’s emphasis on the centrality of pride to contempt was reminiscent of French 
Augustinians like Malebranche. It also led him to rule out any resemblance between contempt 
and indifference. Because ‘pride and hatred’ tend to ‘invigorate the soul,’ the contemptuous 
will be moved to dramatically alter their behavior in the face of whatever they scorn, usually 
by placing physical distance between it and themselves.109 Indeed, Hume took it for granted 
that social elites would be incapable of behaving indifferently in the presence of the poor and 
would instead strive to keep them at bay. Far from exhorting them to restrain themselves in 
this regard, Hume merely considered such behaviour to be a standard example of how ‘we 
commonly keep at a distance such as we contemn, and allow not our inferiors to approach too 
near.’110 There is little indication that he saw this is as a perversion of contempt in need of 
correction, as Descartes might have. Hume’s primary task, as he saw it, was to illustrate the 
role the passions actually play in everyday life rather than indicate how they might be 
tempered through self-mastery. There is, in other words, no equivalent of the Cartesian 
généreux to be found in Hume’s analysis, or in many accounts of the passions that came after 




We have seen that around the middle of the seventeenth century contempt ceased to 
be mainly a form of indifference and became instead a passion, at least for the purposes of 
philosophical analysis. It is important in acknowledging this shift to avoid overstating its 
significance or confusing a change in philosophical classification with a more profound 
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cultural or social-psychological transformation. There were contemptuous people before 
1649, and there were certainly contemptuous people after that date, irrespective of how their 
passions were classified and described by philosophers. Nevertheless, shifts in 
conceptualization do matter for the simple reason that moral emotions like contempt are not 
entirely independent of ‘what we take them to be.’111 As Amy Schmitter has recently written, 
‘the concepts we apply to the passions and emotions are not neutral or inert to what they 
describe’ in that ‘how we understand the passions affects what they are.’112 When Descartes 
made contempt a passion, he made it an object of moral concern as much as an item of 
philosophical analysis, and gestured towards the ways abuses of it might be tempered. If 
before Descartes contempt was emblematic of self-control, after him it increasingly joined the 
other passions as the potential object of that control.   
Moreover, even if conceptual shifts are not themselves causes of social or cultural 
change, they can nevertheless serve as indexes of larger transitions in the societies in which 
they are embedded. It was no accident that Descartes’ analysis of contempt and refashioning 
of générosité presented the honour ethos of the aristocracy in a negative light. This ethos had 
not only fuelled warfare in Europe among glory-thirsty aristocrats, it was also an obstacle to 
experiments in political absolutism then gathering steam, experiments legitimated in part by 
the perceived need to curtail violence among those willing to vindicate their honor by any 
means. By limiting the range of the contemptible to freely willed actions rather than morally 
arbitrary factors such as poverty or low social status, Descartes delegitimated most 
aristorcratic contempt. In this way he gave conceptual fodder to those seeking to substitute 
virtue for rank or wealth as the basic criterion for distributing esteem in European societies.  
Telling the story of how contempt became a passion can also illuminate what is at 
stake in how contemporary moral philosophers have chosen to classify it. The philosophers 
who have defended contempt of late have been consistent in referring to it as an ‘attitude’ or 
form of ‘intentional appraisal’ rather than an emotion.113 This choice makes sense to the 
extent that these philosophers wish to present contempt as very much within our control; an 
attitude we intentionally direct towards those we deem deserving. By contrast, when 
seventeenth-century philosophers deemed contempt a passion they were acknowledging that 
there was something alarmingly unruly about it. For the likes of Descartes, contempt was not 
a judgment that we choose to bestow upon those we think deserving of it, but rather a passion 
that threatens to engulf us independently of our deliberate pursuits or conscious judgments. 
By subtly deemphasizing the affective dimension of contempt today, philosophers show 
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themselves to be more optimistic about regulating its destructive effects than Descartes (and 
certainly his critics) ever were.  
 
 
